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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
 This case involves a court's authority to order a private 
organization that sponsors prizefights to strip a champion of his 
title.  Defendant Francois Botha defeated plaintiff Axel Schulz 
in a fight for the International Boxing Federation (IBF) 
heavyweight championship.  Botha then tested positive for use of 
steroids.  After a hearing, the IBF declined to disqualify Botha, 
allowing him to retain his IBF crown.  Schulz sued and the 
district court issued a preliminary injunction mandating that the 
IBF disqualify Botha.  Botha, the IBF, and the IBF's parent 
United States Boxing Association (USBA) now appeal the grant of 
the preliminary injunction. 
 
 I.  Background 
 Three major bodies regulate and promote the sport of 
professional boxing:  the World Boxing Association, the World 
Boxing Council, and the International Boxing Federation with its 
parent United States Boxing Association.  Each of these 
organizations classifies boxers by weight class, ranks the boxers 
within each class, and, for a participation fee, sponsors -- or 
"sanctions" -- both championship and non-championship bouts.  The 
IBF was formed to provide a mechanism through which the United 
States Boxing Association, a national organization, could crown 
world champions.  According to its literature, the IBF was 
organized "by representatives of various athletic commissions and 
other interested persons for the purpose of obtaining greater 
efficiency and uniformity in the supervision of professional 
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boxing and to encourage and assist professional boxing."  App. 
274.   
 The IBF has promulgated a set of rules and regulations 
governing IBF-sanctioned bouts.  Rule 20, entitled "Anti-doping," 
requires boxers to provide a urine specimen after each fight to 
be tested for, among other substances, anabolic steroids and pain 
killers.  This rule adds that "[s]hould that specimen prove 
positive, disciplinary action will follow."  App. 284.  In 
addition, Rule 26, entitled "Penalties," provides as follows:   
Should anyone be found in violation of the rules and 
regulations of the IBF or USBA by any Committees 
impaneled by the President, they may be subject to 
fine, forfeiture of monies, vacation of title or any 
other discipline directed by the Committee and approved 
by the President for the good of the organization. 
 
App. 291. 
 On December 9, 1995, Francois Botha of South Africa fought 
Axel Schulz of Germany in Stuttgart for the vacant IBF 
heavyweight championship.  Before the bout, each fighter paid the 
IBF more than $45,000 in "sanctioning fees" and other fees.  Each 
boxer's representative also signed a document entitled "Rules for 
IBF/USBA & Intercontinental Championship Bouts" ("Bout Rules").  
 The Bout Rules were also signed by Robert W. Lee, president of 
the IBF/USBA, and by a representative of the local boxing 
commission, the German Boxing Federation.  The Bout Rules begin 
by stating that "[t]he Championship fight will be governed by the 
rules and regulations of the IBF/USBA and local Boxing Commission 
. . . ."  App. 83.  The Bout Rules then set out four pages of 
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detailed requirements.  The last of these is entitled "Anti-
Doping" and reads as follows: 
Each boxer is required to take a urinalysis immediately 
following the bout.  Said specimen must be taken with a 
Ringside Physician and Commission Inspector on hand.  
The specimens should be taken in a plastic container 
and properly marked by the physician and boxer.  It 
should be divided into two parts for each boxer, with 
bottles [sic] #1 being submitted to the laboratory.  
Should either boxer's specimen be positive for drugs, 
etc., all parties will be notified and another test 
made at a laboratory selected by the boxer and the 
local Commission.  Should that specimen prove positive, 
disqualification and disciplinary action will follow. 
Specimens will be tested for the following drugs: 
 
There follows a list that includes anabolic steroids and pain 
killers.  App. 87. 
 An identical "Anti-doping" rule appears in an IBF/USBA 
document titled "Ring Officials Guide and Medical Seminar 
Outline."  This Guide's introduction states that "[t]he major 
purpose of this Ring Officials Guide is to establish criteria to 
be followed in all IBF/USBA boxing matches so that uniformity in 
actions, responsibilities, duties and total performance of ring 
Officials can be attained . . . ."  App. 65. 
 In the Stuttgart fight, Botha defeated Schulz in a split 
decision to win the IBF heavyweight championship.  Each fighter 
then gave a urine specimen.  Botha's specimen was sent to a 
German laboratory, where it tested positive for anabolic 
steroids.  In accord with the anti-doping Bout Rule, Botha was 
then allowed to choose where the sample would be tested a second 
time; his choice, the UCLA Olympic Analytical Laboratory, also 
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found anabolic steroids in his urine.  During this period, Botha 
vigorously denied using steroids.   
 The German Boxing Federation -- the local boxing commission 
that signed the Bout Rules -- recommended on February 15, 1996 
that the IBF disqualify Botha and that Schulz be designated IBF 
world champion.  The Federation also barred all the boxers, 
promoters, referees, and trainers whom it licensed from taking 
part in Botha's bouts for two years. 
 On Saturday, February 24, 1996, upwards of two months after 
the Stuttgart bout, the IBF held a hearing in Elizabeth, New 
Jersey, to determine what action would be taken as a result of 
the positive steroid tests.1  The hearing was conducted by the 
IBF's Executive Committee and its subcommittee, the Championship 
Committee; the Championship Committee was to make a 
recommendation to the Executive Committee, which had final 
authority.  All persons having an interest in the outcome of the 
Botha/Schulz bout were notified of the hearing and given an 
opportunity to be heard.  The committees heard testimony from 
Botha, from his attorney and two of his doctors, and from 
representatives of Schulz, the German Boxing Federation, and 
Michael Moorer.   
 Moorer was at the time a former IBF and World Boxing 
Association heavyweight champion.  In September 1995, Moorer had 
                     
1.  Presumably the hearing was held in New Jersey because the 
IBF's principal place of business is in that state. 
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sued the IBF in federal court in New Jersey over the IBF's 
rankings, seeking to block the Botha/Schulz bout because, he 
argued, he was entitled to fight next for the title.  A 
settlement agreement signed later that month provided that Moorer 
would dismiss his action in return for a guarantee that he would, 
within 180 days of the Botha/Schulz bout, fight the winner for 
the IBF title.  At the IBF's February 24, 1996 hearing, Moorer's 
counsel reminded the IBF of its agreement with Moorer. 
 Botha's testimony at the hearing was a surprise:  he 
admitted for the first time that he had taken the drug found in 
his urine.  He argued, however, that he had not known that what 
he took was a steroid.  Botha stated that he had injured his arm 
in 1988 and his South African doctor had given him two 
prescriptions for the pain and swelling.  In March 1995, after 
Botha had moved to California, his South African doctor had sent 
him a third medication for his continuing arm stiffness, which 
was the steroid (Deca Durabolin) that turned up in his urine.  
(There is a good deal of controversy about the steroids' possible 
impact on Botha's capacity as a fighter, but the controversy -- 
the main elements of which are summarized in the annexed 
footnote2 -- does not appear to bear upon the issue before this 
                     
2. At its February hearing, the IBF heard testimony from two of 
Botha's California doctors -- neither of them pharmacologists -- 
that the drugs had no effect on the outcome of the fight.   
 The principal evidence that the drugs prescribed for Botha 
were taken in a deliberate attempt to increase his muscle mass is 
an affidavit of Dr. Robert Voy, an expert in drug use by 
athletes.  This affidavit, submitted by Moorer's counsel, was not 
before the IBF at its hearing but was before the district court 
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court, namely the appropriateness of the district court's 
preliminary injunction.) 
 After hearing all the testimony, the IBF Championship and 
Executive Committees recessed to deliberate.  When they returned, 
IBF President Robert W. Lee announced the IBF's decision:   
 We will not vacate the title of Francois Botha.  There 
are mitigating circumstances which cause us to feel 
that we should not vacate the title of Francois Botha. 
  
 However, what we will do is we will fine Francois Botha 
in the amount of $50,000 for having taken these 
substances into his system that were in violation of 
our rules.   
 Secondly, we will order a rematch between Francois 
Botha and Axel Schulz to take place within 180 days of 
today or not later than August 24, 1996. 
 Thirty days prior to that fight taking place Francois 
Botha must give a urinalysis to show that he no longer 
has these substances in his system. 
 The winner between Francois Botha and Axel Schulz will 
be obliged to fight Michael Moorer within 120 days of 
the date that they fight . . . . 
 
App. 210-11.3  This announcement triggered vehement protests in 
                                                                  
at the preliminary injunction hearing.  The affidavit provides 
the following information:  The two drugs prescribed for Botha in 
South Africa were anabolic steroids.  Botha's use of the two 
steroids together indicates that they were taken in a fashion 
known as "stacking,"  which is a technique to prevent 
"aromatization," a process by which the body rids itself of the 
drugs.  This technique is used only by experienced steroid users 
to enhance their performance.  Finally, Deca Durabolin -- the 
only steroid found in Botha's urine -- has very few legitimate 
medical uses; it does not, for example, relieve pain.  No 
evidence was presented to the district court that Botha had any 
of the conditions that would indicate legitimate use of the 
steroid. 
3.  At the hearing, the IBF did not explain the "mitigating 
circumstances" that led it to decline to disqualify Botha.  After 
this suit was initiated, IBF President Lee stated in a 
"certification" submitted to the district court that the 
mitigating circumstances were:  (1) that the steroid was 
prescribed by a doctor for a 1988 injury; (2) that Botha admitted 
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the hearing room, but, after some wrangling, the hearing was 
adjourned with the IBF's decision unchanged. 
 Over the weekend, however, the members of the IBF Executive 
Committee conferred over the phone.  On Monday, February 26, the 
Executive Committee issued an amended ruling in writing, stating 
that its members had not previously given sufficient 
consideration to the IBF's commitment to Moorer.4  The amended 
ruling preserved the $50,000 fine against Botha but restructured 
the scheduled fights:  Moorer would challenge Botha for the title 
before June 9, 1996, with Schulz to fight the winner of this bout 
within 120 days. 
 Schulz, together with his promoters Cedric Kushner 
Promotions and Der Firmer Sauerland Promotion, and his manager 
Wilfried Sauerland, brought suit in the District of New Jersey, 
naming the USBA and IBF as defendants, with Botha and Moorer 
joined as necessary defendants because their rights were 
affected.  Moorer filed a counterclaim and crossclaim seeking 
specific performance of his settlement agreement with the IBF.  
                                                                  
taking the medication but denied knowing that it was a steroid; 
(3) that Botha exhibited none of the typical signs of prolonged 
steroid use; (4) that the Executive Committee believed the 
steroid use did not appear to have affected the outcome of the 
fight; (5) that Botha had ceased taking the medication; and (6) 
that the championship should, in the Committee's view, be decided 
in the ring rather than on the sidelines.  App. 298. 
4.  Moorer apparently relied on the settlement agreement with the 
IBF, refusing a match with George Foreman that would have earned 
him $2.7 million in order to be available for his title bout with 
the winner of the Botha/Schulz fight.  App. 340. 
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The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1332.5  
 After a hearing, the district court found that Schulz and 
his co-plaintiffs had met the criteria for preliminary injunctive 
relief.6  On March 29, 1996, the court accordingly ordered that  
(1) the USBA and IBF "amend their decision of February 26, 1996 
so as to disqualify Francois Botha"; (2) Moorer and Schulz 
"proceed to a bout prior to June 9, 1996 as set forth in the 
September 19, 1995 settlement agreement" between Moorer and the 
USBA and IBF; (3) the USBA and IBF "determine the consequences of 
the order with respect to the ratings of the various boxers in 
conjunction with the IBF rules"; and (4) plaintiffs post a 
$100,000 bond. 
 The IBF/USBA and Botha separately appeal the issuance of the 
preliminary injunction, which Schulz and Moorer seek to have 
                     
5.  Plaintiffs Schulz and Sauerland are citizens of Germany, 
Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. is incorporated and headquartered 
in New York, and Der Firmer Sauerland Promotion, A.G., is 
incorporated and headquartered in Switzerland.  Defendant Botha 
is a South African citizen living in California.  Defendant 
Moorer is citizen of Florida.  The USBA is incorporated in 
Michigan and headquartered in New Jersey.  The IBF, originally a 
voluntary non-profit corporation organized under the laws of 
Rhode Island, became a for-profit Oregon corporation in 1986; its 
headquarters are in New Jersey.    
6.  In district courts within this circuit, "[i]n order to 
support a preliminary injunction, plaintiff must show both a 
likelihood of success on the merits and a probability of 
irreparable harm.  Additionally, the district court should 
consider the effect of the issuance of a preliminary injunction 
on other interested persons and the public interest."  Bradley v. 
Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1175 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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upheld.  This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1292.  A motions panel of this court denied the IBF's motion for 
a stay and Botha's motion for an expedited appeal.   
 On June 22, 1996, Moorer and Schulz fought the bout mandated 
by the preliminary injunction.7  Moorer won, regaining the IBF 
championship belt.  On November 9, 1996 (some ten days after the 
argument of this appeal), Moorer fought Botha, successfully 
defending his title with a twelfth-round TKO. 
  
 II.  Analysis 
 We review a district court's ruling on a preliminary 
injunction to determine if there has been an abuse of discretion, 
an error of law, or a clear mistake of fact.  See Louis Vuitton 
v. White, 945 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1991).  In this appeal, the 
parties dispute whether the district judge was correct in finding 
that Schulz and his co-plaintiffs (hereinafter "Schulz") were 
likely to succeed on the merits of their claim.  No party 
challenges the district court's findings regarding irreparable 
harm or the effect of the injunction on third parties and the 
public interest. 
 A. 
 Without discussing specific precedents, the district court 
summarized the law governing this case as follows:   
 
                     
7.  "Moorer Beats Schulz to Reclaim IBF Crown," Phila. Inquirer, 
June 23, 1996, at D3. 
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 We are dealing here with a private association, albeit 
one in which the public has a substantial interest.  
Under New Jersey law a private association has the 
right to adopt, administer and interpret its internal 
regulations and is granted substantial deference when 
judicial review is sought.  When, however, an 
association departs from its own prescribed procedures, 
or where its actions are in total violation of its own 
rules and regulations, a court will intervene to 
protect the property rights and other substantial 
interests of those who are subject to its rules. 
 . . . 
 The critical question is whether the IBF violated its 
rules when it failed to disqualify Botha for his drug 
use. 
 
App. 533-34.   
 After reviewing the Bout Rules and the IBF rules and 
regulations, the district court concluded: 
 It is abundantly clear to me that IBF and USBA have 
established a policy that has been made crystal clear 
to the boxers who fight under their aegis that no boxer 
is to take the drugs proscribed in the rules, and that 
if a boxer does take such drugs he will be disqualified 
regardless of what other disciplines may be imposed.  
The broad general language which appears in Rule 26 
cannot trump the unmistakably clear language of the 
Bout Rules which the IBF and the boxers sign and the 
Ring Officials Guide which IBF and USBA promulgate.  It 
is hard to imagine how the two organizations can adopt 
any other policy if they were to retain the confidence 
of the public and the fighting profession. 
 
App. 536-37.  On this basis, the district court concluded that 
Schulz had a high likelihood of succeeding on the merits. 
 B. 
 With the opinion of the district court as predicate, we 
proceed to examine whether the court had the authority to set 
aside the IBF's decision not to disqualify Botha.  As the court 
properly observed, the courts of New Jersey (and like courts in 
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other jurisdictions) will ordinarily defer to the internal 
decisions of private organizations.  Indeed, "[c]ourts have been 
understandably reluctant to interfere with the internal affairs 
of [private] associations and their reluctance has ordinarily 
promoted the health of society."  Falcone v. Middlesex County 
Medical Society, 170 A.2d 791, 796 (N.J. 1961).8 
 1. 
 In Rutledge v. Gulian, 459 A.2d 680 (N.J. 1983), the New 
Jersey Supreme Court identified the limited occasions when a 
court may set aside the determinations of private organizations 
regarding discipline of their members.9  Rutledge was a former 
                     
8.  All parties agree that New Jersey law applies to this action 
challenging a decision made at a hearing held in New Jersey by 
the IBF, which is headquartered in New Jersey.  Indeed, the IBF's 
rules and regulations specify that in litigation involving the 
activities of the IBF, "the laws of the State of Rhode Island 
and/or New Jersey shall apply."  App. 285.  (As previously 
mentioned, the IBF was originally incorporated in Rhode Island.  
See supra note 5.) 
9.   The district court and the parties have treated this case as 
one involving judicial intervention in the affairs of a private 
voluntary organization.  Within this framework, Rutledge controls 
our decision in this case.  We observe, however, that the IBF is 
more than simply a voluntary social association:  it is a profit-
making corporation which wields substantial economic power over 
the careers of boxers fighting under its aegis.  Moreover, as the 
district court noted, the public has a substantial interest in 
the IBF's actions and in its integrity.  The judicial interest in 
protecting those who may be detrimentally affected by an 
organization like the IBF is greater than the judicial interest 
in protecting members of purely social organizations.  Indeed, 
New Jersey's courts have a long tradition of intervening to 
protect the rights of those affected by organizations which 
possess near-monopoly power or which strongly affect the public 
interest.  See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 
A.2d 355, 367-68 (N.J.) (holding that a beachfront association's 
limitation on membership to borough residents violates public 
policy), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); Moore v. Local Union 
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Grand Master of a Masonic Grand Lodge who had been found guilty 
of misappropriation of lodge funds by a Masonic trial panel under 
the Masonic Code for Trials.  A successor Grand Master suspended 
operation of the Code for Trials procedures by which the local 
lodge would ordinarily have imposed punishment, ordering instead 
that a special "Lodge of Judgment" convene to determine 
Rutledge's punishment.  Rutledge challenged the Masons' 
unwillingness to discipline him according to their established 
procedures. 
 The Rutledge court began by setting out the applicable 
standard: 
 In Higgins v. American Soc'y of Clinical Pathologists, 
51 N.J. 191, 238 A.2d 665 (1968), this Court analyzed 
judicial intervention into the affairs of a private 
organization as follows:  (1) does the plaintiff have 
an interest sufficient to warrant judicial action, and 
(2) has that interest been subjected to an 
unjustifiable interference by the defendant?   
 
459 A.2d at 682.   
 In examining the first prong, the court concluded that 
Rutledge's "status, attributable to membership in a prestigious, 
                                                                  
No. 483, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental 
Ironworkers, 334 A.2d 1, 5-6 (N.J. 1975) (requiring a union to 
reconsider plaintiff's application for membership fairly and 
reasonably); Falcone, 170 A.2d at 799-800 (striking down a 
medical society's membership requirement of four years' 
attendance at an A.M.A.-approved medical college as violative of 
public policy).  Cf. New Jersey Coalition Against War in the 
Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 768, 775-777 
(N.J. 1994) (recognizing a state constitutional right to 
distribute political leaflets at a privately-owned regional 
shopping center, "the functional equivalent of yesterday's 
downtown business district"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 62 (1995). 
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socially-active fraternity, merit[ed] protection from 
unreasonable discomfiture."  Id. at 683.10   
 With respect to the second prong of the test articulated in 
Higgins, the Rutledge court concluded that an organization 
subjects a plaintiff's interest to "unjustifiable interference" 
in either of two circumstances:  when the organization's conduct 
is driven by principles that violate public policy, or when the 
procedures employed by the organization offend principles of 
fundamental fairness.  459 A.2d at 683-84; see also Brounstein v. 
American Cat Fanciers Association, 839 F. Supp. 1100, 1110-12 
(D.N.J. 1993) (summarizing the Rutledge test).  The Rutledge 
court determined that, although Rutledge's membership in the 
Masons was an interest that merited judicial protection, the 
convening of the Lodge of Judgment did not violate either public 
policy or fundamental fairness. 
 2. 
 Following the Rutledge test, and undertaking to assess the 
issues as of the time the district court issued its preliminary 
injunction, we must therefore ascertain, first, whether Schulz 
                     
10.  In addition to membership interests in social organizations, 
courts following New Jersey law have also protected a member's 
economic and status interests in belonging to a professional 
society, see Higgins v. American Society of Clinical 
Pathologists, 238 A.2d 665, 670 (N.J. 1968) (protecting 
plaintiff's interest in certification as a medical technologist), 
and in retaining a professional license, see Brounstein v. 
American Cat Fanciers Association, 839 F. Supp. 1100, 1110 
(D.N.J. 1993) (protecting plaintiff's interest in a license to 
judge cats).    
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had "an interest sufficient to warrant judicial action," and -- 
if the answer to the first question is in the affirmative -- 
second, whether "that interest [was] subjected to an 
unjustifiable interference" by the IBF.  In considering the first 
prong, we observe that Schulz's status in the boxing community, 
as well as his public reputation, were clearly affected by the 
IBF's decision not to disqualify Botha.  In addition, although 
Schulz would not have become the champion on Botha's 
disqualification,11 he had an economic interest in being declared 
the winner of his bout with Botha.12  We therefore conclude that 
Schulz had an interest in the IBF's decision sufficient to 
warrant judicial action.13  
 3. 
 In determining whether Schulz's interest was "subjected to 
an unjustifiable interference" by the IBF, we must inquire 
                     
11.  The IBF's Rule 10 provides that a champion loses his title 
if he is disqualified, but a losing challenger does not thereupon 
become champion; rather, the title becomes vacant.  Schulz and 
Botha were fighting for the title vacated by George Foreman when 
he retired, so both boxers had the status of challenger. 
12.  The winner of the Botha/Schulz fight would next fight Moorer 
for the vacant title.  Although the purse split between a 
champion and a challenger is usually negotiated, if the parties 
cannot agree the IBF holds a "purse bid" with the champion 
receiving 75% of the total bid and the challenger receiving 25%. 
 See IBF Rule 23, App. 285.  Hence it was financially more 
advantageous for Schulz to fight for a vacant title, with a 
background norm of a 50/50 purse split between the two 
challengers, than to challenge a champion.   
13.  The interests of Schulz's co-plaintiffs in this action -- 
his manager and his promoters -- are derivative of Schulz's 
interest and likewise merited protection. 
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whether the IBF's refusal to disqualify Botha violated either 
public policy or fundamental fairness.  If the refusal offended 
either of these principles, then the Rutledge standard was met 
and judicial intervention was warranted.  
  We turn first to public policy.  The Rutledge court made 
clear that public policy on its own can justify judicial 
protection of a plaintiff's interests.14  In determining New 
Jersey public policy, we turn to the enactments of the state 
legislature as an authoritative source.  See Higgins, 238 A.2d at 
671 ("The grant of a license to a laboratory director found by 
the State Board of Medical Examiners to be qualified in 
compliance with [N.J.S.A. 45:9-42.1 et. seq.] evinces a 
legislative policy determination that the operation of 
bioanalytical laboratories by qualified non-doctors, as well as 
by physicians, is in the public interest."); see also Desai v. 
St. Barnabas Medical Center, 510 A.2d 662, 666-67 (N.J. 1986).15 
                     
14.  The court cited two examples of unreasonable interferences 
based on principles violating public policy.  In Higgins, the 
court struck down as violative of public policy a rule of the 
American Society of Clinical Pathologists forbidding its members 
to associate with a laboratory not run by a licensed physician.  
See 238 A.2d at 671.  In Zelenka v. Benevolent and Protective 
Order of Elks, 324 A.2d 35, 37 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. 
denied, 331 A.2d 17 (1974), the court held that the Elks' ban on 
its members publicly criticizing the organization's racial 
restrictions violated public policy.   
15.  In Desai, the court reasoned that  
 
[t]he judicial understanding of the public role of a 
hospital is firmly supported by considerations of 
public policy.  The Legislature itself has expressly 
declared in the Health Care Facilities Planning Act . . 
.  that "hospital and related health care services of 
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   The New Jersey legislature has declared, as "the public 
policy of [the] State," that 
it is in the best interest of the public . . . that boxing . 
. . should be subject to an effective and efficient 
system of strict control and regulation in order to . . 
. [p]romote the public confidence and trust in the 
regulatory process and the conduct of boxing . . . .   
 
N.J. Stat. § 5:2A-2.  Moreover, the regulations of the state 
Department of Law and Public Safety implementing this statute 
also evince a purpose to instill public confidence in the sport. 
 Cf. Desai, 510 A.2d at 667 (relying in part on agency 
regulations to ascertain New Jersey's public policy).  The 
Department's 1995 proposal for readoption of its regulations 
noted that "[t]he rules in this chapter have helped New Jersey be 
recognized as a leader in the area of boxing regulation" and 
observed that a primary purpose of the rules was "furthering the 
trust and confidence of the public."  27 N.J.R. 2096 (June 5, 
1995).   
 Both the legislative and executive branches of the New 
Jersey state government have, therefore, made it clear that they 
consider it to be the public policy of the state to inspire the 
                                                                  
the highest quality, of demonstrated need, efficiently 
provided and properly utilized at a reasonable cost are 
of vital concern to the public health." . . .  Through 
the Facilities Act, the State exercises extensive 
supervisory and regulatory control over hospital 
functions. . . .  The breadth and depth of this 
regulatory jurisdiction reflect and illustrate the 
State's profound concern with public health care.   
 
510 A.2d at 666-67 (citations omitted). 
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"trust and confidence" of the citizenry in boxing.  The public's 
confidence that the outcome of a prizefight is fair rests 
squarely on the assumption that the result was not improperly 
influenced -- by illicit equipment,16 by gifts,17 or by the 
involvement of managers convicted of crimes of moral turpitude.18 
 The regulations of the state Department of Law and Public 
Safety also make clear that "the public confidence and trust" in 
boxing are promoted by banning the use of substances that can 
affect a boxer's performance.  See N.J. Admin. Code tit. 13:46 § 
12.3(a) (1995).  The regulations provide that "[t]he use of any 
drug . . . by a boxer either before or during a match, shall 
result in the immediate disqualification of the boxer from the 
match and indefinite suspension from boxing."  Id.  
 This express statement of public policy by New Jersey's 
political branches is mirrored in the Bout Rules that the IBF 
drafted and required the pugilists to sign before the Stuttgart 
                     
16.  See N.J. Admin. Code tit. 13:46 § 3.3 ("In all bouts, the 
gloves shall be inspected by the Commissioner's inspector and the 
ringside physician prior to the fight.")  The gloves must also be 
placed on the boxer's hands under the supervision of the 
inspector.  See id. 
17.  See N.J. Admin. Code tit. 13:46 § 23A.4 ("No appointee [of 
the State Athletic Control Board] shall solicit, receive or agree 
to receive . . . any gift, favor, service or other thing of value 
whatsoever . . . ."). 
18.  See N.J. Admin. Code tit. 13:46 § 6.18 ("A license of any 
manager shall be suspended for an arrest for or revoked on a 
conviction of any offense in this or any other jurisdiction which 
would be under New Jersey law a crime of moral turpitude or any 
other offense which indicates that licensure would be inimical to 
the conduct of the sport of boxing in this State."). 
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fight.19  Given the strength of New Jersey's public policy, we 
concur in the district court's observation that the IBF could not 
have established a less demanding protocol.  See supra at 10.  Of 
course, the bout took place not in New Jersey but in Germany; 
however, to the extent we have any information regarding the 
policy of the fight venue, we observe that the German Boxing 
Federation not only recommended that Botha be disqualified for 
his steroid use, but banned all persons whom it licenses from 
participating in Botha's bouts for two years. 
  New Jersey has adopted an express policy of promoting the 
public trust and confidence in boxing, and has specifically 
mandated disqualification of boxers who use drugs.  The IBF 
itself has adopted, and reaffirmed shortly before the contest at 
issue here, an identical rule mandating disqualification for drug 
use.  The public's trust and confidence in boxing is undermined 
if one of the sport's major sanctioning bodies flouts its own 
                     
19.  We agree with the district court that the mandatory 
disqualification language in the Bout Rules takes precedence over 
the IBF's rules and regulations.  The Bout Rules contain both 
specific language that "disqualification will follow" and general 
language that the IBF regulations apply.  It is well established 
that within a particular document containing conflicting specific 
and general provisions, the specific provisions control.  See, 
e.g., Wilson v. Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board, 536 
A.2d 752, 756 (N.J. 1988).  In addition, the Bout Rules 
specifically govern the Botha/Schulz fight in Stuttgart, whereas 
the rules and regulations are generic.  Again, where two sources 
of law conflict, familiar rules of construction dictate that the 
more specific controls over the more general.  See, e.g., New 
Jersey Transit Corporation v. Borough of Somerville, 661 A.2d 
778, 782 (N.J. 1995).  
  
 
 19 
rule which comports with the state's public policy.20  We  
conclude, at this preliminary stage, that the IBF's failure to 
disqualify Botha likely violated New Jersey's public policy. 
 
 4. 
 We now return to the standard for judicial intervention in 
the workings of a private organization, as set forth in Rutledge. 
 Under that standard, a reviewing court should invalidate a 
private organization's decision affecting a plaintiff's interest 
only if (1) the plaintiff's interest is sufficient to warrant 
judicial action, and (2) that interest has been subjected to an 
unjustifiable interference by the defendant -- that is, violates 
public policy or fundamental fairness.  We have determined that 
Schulz's interest in the IBF's decision merited judicial 
protection and that the IBF's decision likely violated public 
policy as expressed by New Jersey's legislature and executive 
branch.  Therefore, at this preliminary stage, both elements of 
the Rutledge test were met, and judicial intervention was 
warranted.21     
                     
20.  The district court made an identical finding:  "Protecting 
the integrity of a sport in which there is wide interest is 
important.  The reputation for integrity is threatened if there 
is a rule against drug use but the organization permits the 
fighter to retain a victory notwithstanding that use."  App. 539. 
21.  Because we decide this case on the basis of the "public 
policy" prong of the Rutledge test, we need not reach the 
question whether the IBF's decision not to disqualify Botha was a 
violation of "fundamental fairness."  
 The IBF/USBA's argument that the district court's 
preliminary injunction exceeded the court's authority is without 
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 C. 
 We note, finally, that this case might have been decided on 
alternate grounds.  The district court did not address whether 
the Bout Rules constitute a contract, and none of the parties has 
briefed this question in any detail.  Rather, almost all argument 
has centered on whether the IBF violated its own internal rules 
and, if so, whether a court may then intervene to mandate that 
the IBF disqualify Botha.  Because this case is still at a 
preliminary stage, however, we think it appropriate to point out 
that the Bout Rules themselves may well be deemed a contract, and 
that application of contract law may therefore constitute an 
independent basis for the district court's decision. 
 As the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated:  
A contract arises from offer and acceptance, and must be 
sufficiently definite 'that the performance to be 
rendered by each party can be ascertained with 
reasonable certainty.' . . .  Thus, if parties agree on 
essential terms and manifest an intention to be bound 
by those terms, they have created an enforceable 
contract.   
 
Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 608 A.2d 280, 284 (N.J. 1992) 
(citations omitted).  Of course, "[n]o contract is enforceable . 
                                                                  
merit.  In ordering the fight between Schulz and Moorer, the 
court did not "unwittingly set the purses for the fighters for 
future bouts."  IBF/USBA Br. at 22.  The IBF's settlement 
agreement with Moorer mandated that Moorer's fight with the 
winner of the Schulz/Botha bout be for the IBF title.  It is this 
agreement, and not the district court's order enforcing it, that 
may have set the purses for future bouts.  Moreover, the parties 
agreed at the preliminary injunction hearing that if Botha were 
disqualified, Schulz would fight Moorer.  App. 528. 
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. . without the flow of consideration -- both sides must 'get 
something' out of the exchange."  Continental Bank of 
Pennsylvania v. Barclay Riding Academy, Inc., 459 A.2d 1163, 1171 
(N.J.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983) (citations omitted).   
 The Bout Rules were signed by representatives of Botha and 
Schulz as well as the IBF and the German Boxing Federation; the 
signatures manifested an intention to be bound by these rules.  
The provisions of the Bout Rules were definite, so that "the 
performance to be rendered by each party can be ascertained with 
reasonable certainty."  Each party's agreement to abide by the 
Bout Rules provided consideration for the other parties' 
agreements.  Moreover, each boxer's payment of more than $45,000 
for the privilege of fighting under the IBF's aegis constituted 
additional consideration for the IBF's agreement to enforce the 
Bout Rules.  And, as we have seen, the Bout Rules expressly 
provided that, if one of the boxers violated the anti-doping 
rule, that boxer would be disqualified. 
 Therefore, it appears likely that application of the law of 
contract to this case would yield a result identical to that 
reached in the main body of this opinion. 
 
 III.  Conclusion   
 The district court was correct in finding that Schulz was 
likely to prevail on the merits, and therefore appropriately 
granted the preliminary injunction ordering the IBF, in 
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accordance with its own rules, to disqualify Botha.  
 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the district court 
is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
